With the highest respect, I except the name of Heraclitus. When the rest of the philosophic folk rejected the testimony of the senses because they showed multiplicity and change, he rejected their testimony because they showed things as if they had permanence and unity. Heraclitus too did the senses an injustice. They lie neither in the way the Eleatics believed, nor as he believed--they do not lie at all. What we make of their testimony, that alone introduces lies; for example, the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence. "Reason" is the cause of our falsification of the testimony of the senses. Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie. But Heraclitus will remain eternally right with his assertion that being is an empty fiction. The "apparent" world is the only one: the "true" world is merely added by a lie.
And what magnificent instruments of observation we possess in our senses! This nose, for example, of which no philosopher has yet spoken with reverence and gratitude, is actually the most delicate instrument so far at our disposal: it is able to detect minimal differences of motion which even a spectroscope cannot detect. Today we possess science precisely to the extent to which we have decided to accept the testimony of the senses--to the extent to which we sharpen them further, arm them, and have learned to think them through. The rest is miscarriage and not-yet-science--in other words, metaphysics, theology, psychology, epistemology--or formal science, a doctrine of signs, such as logic and that applied logic which is called mathematics. In them reality is not encountered at all, not even as a problem--no more than the question of the value of such a sign-convention as logic.
The other idiosyncrasy of the philosophers is no less dangerous; it consists in confusing the last and the first. They place that which comes at the end--unfortunately! for it ought not to come at all!--namely, the "highest concepts," which means the most general, the emptiest concepts, the last smoke of evaporating reality, in the beginning, as the beginning. This again is nothing but their way of showing reverence: the higher may not grow out of the lower, may not have grown at all. Moral: whatever is of the first rank must be causa sui. Origin out of something else is considered an objection, a questioning of value. All the highest values are of the first rank; all the highest concepts, that which has being, the unconditional, the good, the true, the perfect--all these cannot have become and must therefore be causes. All these, moreover, cannot be unlike each other or in contradiction to each other. Thus they arrive at their stupendous concept, "God." That which is last, thinnest, and emptiest is put first, as the cause, as ens realissimum. Why did mankind have to take seriously the brain afflictions of sick web-spinners? They have paid dearly for it!
At long last, let us contrast the very different manner in which we conceive the problem of error and appearance. (I say "we" for politeness' sake.) Formerly, alteration, change, any becoming at all, were taken as proof of mere appearance, as an indication that there must be something which led us astray. Today, conversely, precisely insofar as the prejudice of reason forces us to posit unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, being, we see ourselves somehow caught in error, compelled into error. So certain are we, on the basis of rigorous examination, that this is where the error lies. It is no different in this case than with the movement of the sun: there our eye is the constant advocate of error, here it is our language. In its origin language belongs in the age of the most rudimentary form of psychology. We enter a realm of crude fetishism when we summon before consciousness the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language, in plain talk, the presuppositions of reason. Everywhere it sees a doer and doing; it believes in will as the cause; it believes in the ego, in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and it projects this faith in the ego-substance upon all things--only thereby does it first create the concept of "thing." Everywhere "being" is projected by thought, pushed underneath, as the cause; the concept of being follows, and is a derivative of, the concept of ego. In the beginning there is that great calamity of an error that the will is something which is effective, that will is a capacity. Today we know that it is only a word. Very much later, in a world which was in a thousand ways more enlightened, philosophers, to their great surprise, became aware of the sureness, the subjective certainty, in our handling of the categories of reason: they concluded that these categories could not be derived from anything empirical--for everything empirical plainly contradicted them. Whence, then, were they derived? And in India, as in Greece, the same mistake was made: "We must once have been at home in a higher world (instead of a very much lower one, which would have been the truth); we must have been divine, for we have reason!" Indeed, nothing has yet possessed a more naive power of persuasion than the error concerning being, as it has been formulated by the Eleatics, for example. After all, every word and every sentence we say speak in its favor. Even the opponents of the Eleatics still succumbed to the seduction of their concept of being: Democritus, among others, when he invented his atom. "Reason" in language--oh, what an old deceptive female she is! I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.
- Handle (verb): To touch, hold or move something with your hands.
- Grasp (noun): A firm hold of something or control over something.
- Worship (verb): To love and admire something very much, especially so much that you cannot see their faults.
- Stuff (verb): To fill the dead body of an animal with material and preserve it, so that it keeps its original shape and appearance.
- Deceiver (noun): Person which make one believe something that is not true.
- Mob (noun): A large crowd of people, especially one that may become violent or cause trouble.
- Wretched (adjective): Used to show that you think that something is extremely annoying.
- Impudent (adjective): Rude; not showing respect for other people.
- Insofar as (idiom): To the degree that.
- The extent to which (idiom): How much.
- Sharpen (verb): To become or make something better, more skilful, more effective, etc. than before.
- Encounter (verb): To experience something, especially something unpleasant or difficult, while you are trying to do something else.
- Lead (verb): To be the reason why someone does or thinks something.
- Summon (verb): To order someone to appear in a court of law.
- Underneath (adverb): Under or below something else, especially when it is hidden or covered by the thing on top.
- Whence (adverb): From where.
- Naught (noun): Used in particular phrases to mean "nothing".
- Slander (noun): A false spoken statement intended to damage the good opinion people have of someone.
- Underhanded (adjective): Secret and dishonest.
This article was written by F.W. Nietzsche, a German philosopher in the nineteenths. So, it's quite interesting to read that kind of things because of the relevance of their works.
Firstly, this article is a part of the book "The Twilight of Idols", the last book that he wrote before his death in 1900. This extract shows the development of the Metaphysics and its relation with the concepts that I mentioned. With a notorious personal style, he demanded not to separate the testimony of the human senses from our consciousness.
Secondly, he talks about "the historical error" which consists in "put the cause as the effect" and "the first as the last" and viceversa. He thinks that all our criterias about Truth or World are conditioned by our Psychology, that is, our power in favour or against Life, our "Dyonisism".
Finally, I'd recommend this article to all the people who are interested in knowing more about this interesting author and also to all the Philosophy students.