Ser y Tiempo

Si el ser debe concebirse a partir del tiempo, y si los diferentes modos y derivados del ser sólo se vuelven efectivamente comprensibles en sus modificaciones y derivaciones cuando se los considera desde la perspectiva del tiempo, entonces quiere decir que el ser mismo —y no sólo el ente en cuanto está “en el tiempo”— se ha hecho visible en su carácter “temporal”. Pero, en tal caso, “temporal” no puede ya significar solamente “lo que está en el tiempo”. También lo “intemporal” y lo “supratemporal” es “temporal” en lo que respecta a su ser. Y esto, a su vez, no sólo en la forma de una privación frente a algo “temporal” en cuanto ente “en el tiempo”, sino en un sentido positivo, aunque todavía por aclarar. Como la expresión “temporal” se ocupa en el uso lingüístico prefilosófico y filosófico en la significación ya indicada, y como en las investigaciones que siguen la expresión será usada en una significación diferente, llamaremos a la determinación originaria del sentido del ser y de sus caracteres y modos, obtenida a partir del tiempo, determinación temporaria. La tarea ontológica fundamental de la interpretación del ser en cuanto tal incluye, pues, el desentrañamiento de la temporariedad del ser. Sólo en la exposición de la problemática de la temporariedad se dará la respuesta concreta a la pregunta por el sentido del ser.

Puesto que el ser sólo es captable, en cada caso, desde la perspectiva del tiempo, la respuesta a la pregunta por el ser no puede consistir en una frase aislada y ciega. La respuesta será incomprensible si nos limitamos a la repetición de lo que en ella se dice en forma de proposición, especialmente si se la hace circular a la manera de un resultado que flota en el vacío y que sólo requiere ser registrado como un simple “punto de vista”, quizás discrepante de la manera usual de abordar las cosas. Si la respuesta es “nueva”, es algo que carece de importancia y no pasa de ser una pura exterioridad. Lo positivo en ella debe estar en que sea lo suficientemente antigua como para aprender a hacerse cargo de las posibilidades deparadas por los “antiguos”. El sentido más propio de la respuesta consiste en prescribir a la investigación ontológica concreta que dé comienzo a la interrogación investigante dentro del horizonte que habrá sido puesto al descubierto. La respuesta no da más que esto.

Por consiguiente, si la respuesta a la pregunta por el ser debe ofrecernos el hilo conductor para toda futura investigación, de allí se sigue que ella no podrá ser adecuada mientras no nos haga comprender el modo de ser específico de la ontología hecha hasta ahora y las vicisitudes de sus problemas, de sus hallazgos y fracasos, como algo necesariamente ligado al modo de ser del Dasein.

Ensayo de Massimo Cacciari

Reason

You ask me which of the philosophers' traits are really idiosyncrasies? For example, their lack of historical sense, their hatred of the very idea of becoming, their Egypticism. They think that they show their respect for a subject when they de-historicize it, sub specie aeternitas--when they turn it into a mummy. All that philosophers have handled for thousands of years have been concept-mummies; nothing real escaped their grasp alive. When these honorable idolators of concepts worship something, they kill it and stuff it; they threaten the life of everything they worship. Death, change, old age, as well as procreation and growth, are to their minds objections--even refutations. Whatever has being does not become; whatever becomes does not have being. Now they all believe, desperately even, in what has being. But since they never grasp it, they seek for reasons why it is kept from them. "There must be mere appearance, there must be some deception which prevents us from perceiving that which has being: where is the deceiver?" "We have found him," they cry ecstatically; "it is the senses! These senses, which are so immoral in other ways too, deceive us concerning the true world. Moral: let us free ourselves from the deception of the senses, from becoming, from history, from lies; history is nothing but faith in the senses, faith in lies. Moral: let us say No to all who have faith in the senses, to all the rest of mankind; they are all 'mob.' Let us be philosophers! Let us be mummies" Let us represent monotono-theism by adopting the expression of a gravedigger! And above all, away with the body, this wretched idée fixe of the senses, disfigured by all the fallacies of logic, refuted, even impossible, although it is impudent enough to behave as if it were real!"

With the highest respect, I except the name of Heraclitus. When the rest of the philosophic folk rejected the testimony of the senses because they showed multiplicity and change, he rejected their testimony because they showed things as if they had permanence and unity. Heraclitus too did the senses an injustice. They lie neither in the way the Eleatics believed, nor as he believed--they do not lie at all. What we make of their testimony, that alone introduces lies; for example, the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence. "Reason" is the cause of our falsification of the testimony of the senses. Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie. But Heraclitus will remain eternally right with his assertion that being is an empty fiction. The "apparent" world is the only one: the "true" world is merely added by a lie.

And what magnificent instruments of observation we possess in our senses! This nose, for example, of which no philosopher has yet spoken with reverence and gratitude, is actually the most delicate instrument so far at our disposal: it is able to detect minimal differences of motion which even a spectroscope cannot detect. Today we possess science precisely to the extent to which we have decided to accept the testimony of the senses--to the extent to which we sharpen them further, arm them, and have learned to think them through. The rest is miscarriage and not-yet-science--in other words, metaphysics, theology, psychology, epistemology--or formal science, a doctrine of signs, such as logic and that applied logic which is called mathematics. In them reality is not encountered at all, not even as a problem--no more than the question of the value of such a sign-convention as logic.

The other idiosyncrasy of the philosophers is no less dangerous; it consists in confusing the last and the first. They place that which comes at the end--unfortunately! for it ought not to come at all!--namely, the "highest concepts," which means the most general, the emptiest concepts, the last smoke of evaporating reality, in the beginning, as the beginning. This again is nothing but their way of showing reverence: the higher may not grow out of the lower, may not have grown at all. Moral: whatever is of the first rank must be causa sui. Origin out of something else is considered an objection, a questioning of value. All the highest values are of the first rank; all the highest concepts, that which has being, the unconditional, the good, the true, the perfect--all these cannot have become and must therefore be causes. All these, moreover, cannot be unlike each other or in contradiction to each other. Thus they arrive at their stupendous concept, "God." That which is last, thinnest, and emptiest is put first, as the cause, as ens realissimum. Why did mankind have to take seriously the brain afflictions of sick web-spinners? They have paid dearly for it!

At long last, let us contrast the very different manner in which we conceive the problem of error and appearance. (I say "we" for politeness' sake.) Formerly, alteration, change, any becoming at all, were taken as proof of mere appearance, as an indication that there must be something which led us astray. Today, conversely, precisely insofar as the prejudice of reason forces us to posit unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, being, we see ourselves somehow caught in error, compelled into error. So certain are we, on the basis of rigorous examination, that this is where the error lies. It is no different in this case than with the movement of the sun: there our eye is the constant advocate of error, here it is our language. In its origin language belongs in the age of the most rudimentary form of psychology. We enter a realm of crude fetishism when we summon before consciousness the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language, in plain talk, the presuppositions of reason. Everywhere it sees a doer and doing; it believes in will as the cause; it believes in the ego, in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and it projects this faith in the ego-substance upon all things--only thereby does it first create the concept of "thing." Everywhere "being" is projected by thought, pushed underneath, as the cause; the concept of being follows, and is a derivative of, the concept of ego. In the beginning there is that great calamity of an error that the will is something which is effective, that will is a capacity. Today we know that it is only a word. Very much later, in a world which was in a thousand ways more enlightened, philosophers, to their great surprise, became aware of the sureness, the subjective certainty, in our handling of the categories of reason: they concluded that these categories could not be derived from anything empirical--for everything empirical plainly contradicted them. Whence, then, were they derived? And in India, as in Greece, the same mistake was made: "We must once have been at home in a higher world (instead of a very much lower one, which would have been the truth); we must have been divine, for we have reason!" Indeed, nothing has yet possessed a more naive power of persuasion than the error concerning being, as it has been formulated by the Eleatics, for example. After all, every word and every sentence we say speak in its favor. Even the opponents of the Eleatics still succumbed to the seduction of their concept of being: Democritus, among others, when he invented his atom. "Reason" in language--oh, what an old deceptive female she is! I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.

It will be appreciated if I condense so essential and so new an insight into four theses. In that way I facilitate comprehension; in that way I provoke contradiction. First proposition. The reasons for which "this" world has been characterized as "apparent" are the very reasons which indicate its reality; any other kind of reality is absolutely indemonstrable. Second proposition. The criteria which have been bestowed on the "true being" of things are the criteria of not-being, of naught, the "true world" has been constructed out of contradiction to the actual world: indeed an apparent world, insofar as it is merely a moral-optical illusion. Third proposition. To invent fables about a world "other" than this one has no meaning at all, unless an instinct of slander, detraction, and suspicion against life has gained the upper hand in us: in that case, we avenge ourselves against life with a phantasmagoria of "another," a "better" life. Fourth proposition. Any distinction between a "true" and an "apparent" world--whether in the Christian manner or in the manner of Kant (in the end, an underhanded Christian)--is only a suggestion of decadence, a symptom of the decline of life. That the artist esteems appearance higher than reality is no objection to this proposition. For "appearance" in this case means reality once more, only by way of selection, reinforcement, and correction. The tragic artist is no pessimist: he is precisely the one who says Yes to everything questionable, even to the terrible--he is Dionysian.

Vocabulary

1. Handle (verb): To touch, hold or move something with your hands.
2. Grasp (noun): A firm hold of something or control over something.
3. Worship (verb): To love and admire something very much, especially so much that you cannot see their faults.
4. Stuff (verb): To fill the dead body of an animal with material and preserve it, so that it keeps its original shape and appearance.
5. Deceiver (noun): Person which make one believe something that is not true.
6. Mob (noun): A large crowd of people, especially one that may become violent or cause trouble.
7. Wretched (adjective): Used to show that you think that something is extremely annoying.
8. Impudent (adjective): Rude; not showing respect for other people.
9. Insofar as (idiom): To the degree that.
10. The extent to which (idiom): How much.
11. Sharpen (verb): To become or make something better, more skilful, more effective, etc. than before.
12. Encounter (verb): To experience something, especially something unpleasant or difficult, while you are trying to do something else.
13. Lead (verb): To be the reason why someone does or thinks something.
14. Summon (verb): To order someone to appear in a court of law.
15. Underneath (adverb): Under or below something else, especially when it is hidden or covered by the thing on top.
16. Whence (adverb): From where.
17. Naught (noun): Used in particular phrases to mean "nothing".
18. Slander (noun): A false spoken statement intended to damage the good opinion people have of someone.
19. Underhanded (adjective): Secret and dishonest.
    

SUMMARY

The article is about the concept of "Reason" in the Philosophy folk and the basis above all the "supra-concepts" as God, Truth or Science.

This article was written by F.W. Nietzsche, a German philosopher in the nineteenths. So, it's quite interesting to read that kind of things because of the relevance of their works.

Firstly, this article is a part of the book "The Twilight of Idols", the last book that he wrote before his death in 1900. This extract shows the development of the Metaphysics and its relation with the concepts that I mentioned. With a notorious personal style, he demanded not to separate the testimony of the human senses from our consciousness.

Secondly, he talks about "the historical error" which consists in "put the cause as the effect" and "the first as the last" and viceversa. He thinks that all our criterias about Truth or World are conditioned by our Psychology, that is, our power in favour or against Life, our "Dyonisism".

OPINIION

First of all, it's quite difficult to separate his literary fashion from the real meaning of it. So, as much as I understood, Science should be based on the Senses. It's a direct attack against Hegelian philosophical system as well as it provoked the catastrophic ending of the WWII. Many scholars think that all the philosophical systems based on only theoretical thinkings ara wrong and Nietzsche was right criticizing that separation between "Praxis and Doxa".

Finally, I'd recommend this article to all the people who are interested in knowing more about this interesting author and also to all the Philosophy students.

On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and; anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions- they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.

We still do not yet know where the drive for truth comes from. For so far we have heard only of the duty which society imposes in order to exist: to be truthful means to employ the usual metaphors. Thus, to express it morally, this is the duty to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie with the herd and in a manner binding upon everyone. Now man of course forgets that this is the way things stand for him. Thus he lies in the manner indicated, unconsciously and in accordance with habits which are centuries' old; and precisely by means of this unconsciousness and forgetfulness he arrives at his sense of truth. From the sense that one is obliged to designate one thing as "red," another as "cold," and a third as "mute," there arises a moral impulse in regard to truth. The venerability, reliability, and utility of truth is something which a person demonstrates for himself from the contrast with the liar, whom no one trusts and everyone excludes. As a "rational" being, he now places his behavior under the control of abstractions. He will no longer tolerate being carried away by sudden impressions, by intuitions. First he universalizes all these impressions into less colorful, cooler concepts, so that he can entrust the guidance of his life and conduct to them. Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends upon this ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a concept. For something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could never be achieved with the vivid first impressions: the construction of a pyramidal order according to castes and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly marked boundaries-a new world, one which now confronts that other vivid world of first impressions as more solid, more universal, better known, and more human than the immediately perceived world, and thus as the regulative and imperative world. Whereas each perceptual metaphor is individual and without equals and is therefore able to elude all classification, the great edifice of concepts displays the rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium and exhales in logic that strength and coolness which is characteristic of mathematics. Anyone who has felt this cool breath [of logic] will hardly believe that even the concept-which is as bony, foursquare, and transposable as a die-is nevertheless merely the residue of a metaphor, and that the illusion which is involved in the artistic transference of a nerve stimulus into images is, if not the mother, then the grandmother of every single concept. But in this conceptual crap game "truth" means using every die in the designated manner, counting its spots accurately, fashioning the right categories, and never violating the order of caste and class rank. Just as the Romans and Etruscans cut up the heavens with rigid mathematical lines and confined a god within each of the spaces thereby delimited, as within a templum, so every people has a similarly mathematically divided conceptual heaven above themselves and henceforth thinks that truth demands that each conceptual god be sought only within his own sphere. Here one may certainly admire man as a mighty genius of construction, who succeeds in piling an infinitely complicated dome of concepts upon an unstable foundation, and, as it were, on running water. Of course, in order to be supported by such a foundation, his construction must be like one constructed of spiders' webs: delicate enough to be carried along by the waves, strong enough not to be blown apart by every wind. As a genius of construction man raises himself far above the bee in the following way: whereas the bee builds with wax that he gathers from nature, man builds with the far more delicate conceptual material which he first has to manufacture from himself. In this he is greatly to be admired, but not on account of his drive for truth or for pure knowledge of things. When someone hides something behind a bush and looks for it again in the same place and finds it there as well, there is not much to praise in such seeking and finding. Yet this is how matters stand regarding seeking and finding "truth" within the realm of reason. If I make up the definition of a mammal, and then, after inspecting a camel, declare "look, a mammal' I have indeed brought a truth to light in this way, but it is a truth of limited value. That is to say, it is a thoroughly anthropomorphic truth which contains not a single point which would be "true in itself" or really and universally valid apart from man. At bottom, what the investigator of such truths is seeking is only the metamorphosis of the world into man. He strives to understand the world as something analogous to man, and at best he achieves by his struggles the feeling of assimilation. Similar to the way in which astrologers considered the stars to be in man 's service and connected with his happiness and sorrow, such an investigator considers the entire universe in connection with man: the entire universe as the infinitely fractured echo of one original sound-man; the entire universe as the infinitely multiplied copy of one original picture-man. His method is to treat man as the measure of all things, but in doing so he again proceeds from the error of believing that he hasthese things [which he intends to measure] immediately before him as mere objects. He forgets that the original perceptual metaphors are metaphors and takes them to be the things themselves.

Only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with any repose, security, and consistency: only by means of the petrification and coagulation of a mass of images which originally streamed from the primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery liquid, only in the invincible faith that this sun, this window, this table is a truth in itself, in short, only by forgetting that he himself is an artistically creating subject, does man live with any repose, security, and consistency. If but for an instant he could escape from the prison walls of this faith, his"self consciousness" would be immediately destroyed. It is even a difficult thing for him to admit to himself that the insect or the bird perceives an entirely different world from the one that man does, and that the question of which of these perceptions of the world is the more correct one is quite meaningless, for this would have to have been decided previously in accordance with the criterion of the correct perception, which means, in accordance with a criterion which is not available. But in any case it seems to me that "the correct perception"-which would mean "the adequate expression of an object in the subject"-is a contradictory impossibility. For between two absolutely different spheres, as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, and no expression; there is, at most, an aesthetic relation: I mean, a suggestive transference, a stammering translation into a completely foreign tongue-for which I there is required, in any case, a freely inventive intermediate sphere and mediating force. "Appearance" is a word that contains many temptations, which is why I avoid it as much as possible. For it is not true that the essence of things "appears" in the empirical world. A painter without hands who wished to express in song the picture before his mind would, by means of this substitution of spheres, still reveal more about the essence of things than does the empirical world. Even the relationship of a nerve stimulus to the generated image is not a necessary one. But when the same image has been generated millions of times and has been handed down for many generations and finally appears on the same occasion every time for all mankind, then it acquires at last the same meaning for men it would have if it were the sole necessary image and if the relationship of the original nerve stimulus to the generated image were a strictly causal one. In the same manner, an eternally repeated dream would certainly be felt and judged to be reality. But the hardening and congealing of a metaphor guarantees absolutely nothing concerning its necessity and exclusive justification.

Every person who is familiar with such considerations has no doubt felt a deep mistrust of all idealism of this sort: just as often as he has quite early convinced himself of the eternal consistency, omnipresence, and fallibility of the laws of nature. He has concluded that so far as we can penetrate here-from the telescopic heights to the microscopic depths-everything is secure, complete, infinite, regular, and without any gaps. Science will be able to dig successfully in this shaft forever, and the things that are discovered will harmonize with and not contradict each other. How little does this resemble a product of the imagination, for if it were such, there should be some place where the illusion and reality can be divined. Against this, the following must be said: if each us had a different kind of sense perception-if we could only perceive things now as a bird, now as a worm, now as a plant, or if one of us saw a stimulus as red, another as blue, while a third even heard the same stimulus as a sound-then no one would speak of such a regularity of nature, rather, nature would be grasped only as a creation which is subjective in the highest degree. After all, what is a law of nature as such for us? We are not acquainted with it in itself, but only with its effects, which means in its relation to other laws of nature-which, in turn, are known to us only as sums of relations. Therefore all these relations always refer again to others and are thoroughly incomprehensible to us in their essence. All that we actually know about these laws of nature is what we ourselves bring to them-time and space, and therefore relationships of succession and number. But everything marvelous about the laws of nature, everything that quite astonishes us therein and seems to demand explanation, everything that might lead us to distrust idealism: all this is completely and solely contained within the mathematical strictness and inviolability of our representations of time and space. But we produce these representations in and from ourselves with the same necessity with which the spider spins. If we are forced to comprehend all things only under these forms, then it ceases to be amazing that in all things we actually comprehend nothing but these forms. For they must all bear within themselves the laws of number, and it is precisely number which is most astonishing in things. All that conformity to law, which impresses us so much in the movement of the stars and in chemical processes, coincides at bottom with those properties which we bring to things. Thus it is we who impress ourselves in this way. In conjunction with this, it of course follows that the artistic process of metaphor formation with which every sensation begins in us already presupposes these forms and thus occurs within them. The only way in which the possibility of subsequently constructing a new conceptual edifice from metaphors themselves can be explained is by the firm persistence of these original forms That is to say, this conceptual edifice is an imitation of temporal, spatial, and numerical relationships in the domain of metaphor.

VOCABULARY

Metonyms (noun): The act of referring to something by the name of something else that is closely connected with it, for example using "the White House" for "the US President".

Enhance (verb): To increase or further improve the good quality, value or status of someone or something.

Embellish (verb): To make something more beautiful by adding decorations to it.

Reliable (adjective): That can be trusted to do something well; that you can rely on.

Upon (preposition): On (formal):

Boundary (noun): A real or imagined live that marks the limits or edges of something and separates it from other things or places; a dividing line.

Whereas (conjuction): Used to compare or contrast two facts.

Bony (adjective): Consisting of or like bone.

Die (noun): Dice (American English).

Nevertheless (adverb): In spite of something that you have just mentioned.

Crap (adjective): Bad; of very bad quality.

Henceforth (adverb): Starting from a particular time and at all times in the future.

Dome (noun): A thing or a building shaped like a round roof with a circular base.

Gather (verb): To collect plants, fruit, etc. from a wide area.

Bush (noun): A plant that grows thickly with several hard stems coming up from the root.

Thoroughly (adverb): Very much; completely.

Strive (verb): To try very hard to achieve something or to defeat something.

Sorrow (noun): A feeling of great sadness because something very bad has happened.

Stammer (verb): To speak with difficulty, repeating sounds or words and often stopping, before saying things correctly.

Congeal (verb): To become thick or solid.

Gap (noun): A space between two things or in the middle of something, especially because there is a part missing.

Dig (verb): To mix with another substance.

Resemble (verb): To look like or be similar to another person or thing.

Grasp (verb): To understand something completely.

SUMMARY

In this text, you can see many cases of "false reason" or "artificial truths" which were constructed by "social life" or "prejudices" from ancient times until now.

With a splendorous style of writing, Nietzsche (the author of this text) opens the discussion about the relation between "Truth" and "Moral", that is to say, what exactly means our process through our mind and "logical sense". That is the key in order to understand well what Nietzsche would mean in this text.

On the other side, he proposes the question about the "genealogy" of our final views, concepts (and their constructions) and, finally, our "truths". He thinks that the whole process begins in a "nervous stimulus" which confers all the basic information which, at the same time, is converted in a concept-truth according to our "social needs" and, also, our basic life needs to survive on the Earth in relation to the previous one too.

OPINION

Summarily, I'm convinced that what Nietzsche said one hundred years ago is a "true" that is difficult to assume yet because our "softiness" towards ourselves and our "truths".

So, as much as I'm concerned, this is a task which might involve many years of solidified prejudices amongst all social classes and our not-yet-resolved lack of sincerity towards ourselves including "our happiness and sorrow".